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INTRODUCTION
Most of what has been written on war to peace transitions focuses on con-
flict resolution techniques.  The outcome of a peace process is considered a func-
tion of the conflict resolution techniques employed.  The significance of the con-
flict situation to which the techniques are applied either are not systematically
taken into account, downplayed, or even completely neglected.  There are two
other strands of the literature that question this virtually exclusive focus on con-
flict resolution techniques:  one set focuses on conflict situations; the other
explores the fit between conflict resolution techniques and conflict situations.
This study scrutinizes the explanatory power of these three strands of lit-
erature by testing the most influential hypotheses each has generated against the
Angolan and the Mozambican experiences.  These cases are chosen partly
because they pose an interesting empirical puzzle.  Although the two cases are
similar, the outcomes were radically different.  In Angola, two peace agreements
– the Bicesse Agreement in 1991 and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 – were con-
cluded in order to terminate the war between the government, the Movimento
Popular de Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA), and the insurgents, the Uniao
Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).   The results of these
two efforts were the same.  The country relapsed into full-scale war after a brief
period of negative peace.  In the Mozambican case, by contrast, a peace accord
– the Rome Agreement – was concluded between the government, the Frente de
Libertaçao de Moçambique (Frelimo), and the insurgency movement, the
Resisténcia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) in 1992.  Despite initial difficul-
ties, the agreement was successfully implemented after two years, and the war
came to an end.  More importantly, Angola and Mozambique are chosen as cases
because many of the arguments that the literature on war to peace transitions has
developed rely on evidence from these two cases.  Revisiting the Angolan and
Mozambican experiences in sufficient depth offers the opportunity to scrutinize
the inferences drawn from these cases.  
Contrary to most of what has been written on these two transitions, and
contrary to the conflict resolution technique and the conflict situation strands of
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the literature, I argue that the outcomes of the Angolan and Mozambican peace
processes stemmed from the incompatibility and compatibility, respectively, of
the conflict situations with the conflict resolution techniques that were employed.
The cases at hand suggest that conflict resolution techniques are not suitable or
unsuitable as such, but adequate or inadequate for a peculiar conflict situation.
This argument is developed in three steps:  first, I identify three sets of lit-
erature on war to peace transitions and the main hypotheses that they generated.
Second, I give an overview of the Angolan and the Mozambican transition peri-
ods, and outline the research design of this study.  Third, I test the applicability
of the hypotheses that I identified in the literature review.  
LITERATURE REVIEW
This section identifies three strands of literature on war to peace transitions
and the main arguments that each set has generated.  The three sets are as fol-
lows:  literature on conflict resolution techniques, on conflict situations, and on
the relationship between conflict resolution techniques and conflict situations.  
Conflict Resolution Techniques
Most of the literature emphasizes the causal relationship between conflict
resolution techniques (i.e. strategies that are designed to end internal war through
a compromise between the conflict parties and not through total victory on the
battlefield) and the success or failure of war to peace transitions.  Different cases
of war to peace transitions are compared and lessons are drawn for other cases
without, however, systematically taking into account different conflict situations.
The irrelevance of the peculiarities of a certain conflict situation is usually
assumed, but in some cases explicitly argued for.1 This set of literature has gen-
erated two main arguments to explain the success and failure of war to peace
transitions in general, and the Angolan and Mozambican peace processes in par-
ticular; these are power-sharing agreements versus winner-takes-all elections,
and the extent of third-party intervention.  
Marina Ottaway argues that successful war to peace transitions require
power-sharing agreements.  Democratization, she suggests, is a disruptive
process, because the rules of the political game that are established in a consoli-
dated democracy are absent during and immediately after a war to peace transi-
tion.  In the absence of these rules, there are no checks and balances for the com-
petition between the conflict parties.  Ottaway therefore suggests that long-term
national conferences are needed to prevent the disruptive effects of democratiza-
tion.2
Caroline Hartzell argues in a similar vein.  Her contention is that the most
extensively institutionalized peace settlements – i.e. agreements that provide
political and economic security for each conflict party after elections have been
held – are most likely to be implemented successfully.  Hartzell distinguishes
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between three degrees of institutionalization:  proportional representation after
the elections is the lowest degree; administrative proportional representation on
the basis of a formula representative of the size of groups is the medium degree;
and the division of political power in a federal system or the granting of region-
al autonomy constitutes the highest degree of institutionalization.  In short, the
more the former war parties disperse power among them, the more secure they
are, and the more likely the war to peace transition is to succeed.3
Many analysts propose that large-scale third-party intervention makes a
war to peace transition more likely to be successful.  Fen Osler Hampson con-
tends that a “successful peace process depends upon a lot of outside help and
assistance, not only with the negotiation of a peace agreement, but also with its
implementation.”4 The importance of large-scale third-party intervention also
features prominently in the studies of other authors, such as Chester Crocker,
Charles William Maynes, Barbara Walter, Rafael López-Pintor, and Nicole Ball.
Success and failure of war to peace transitions are regarded as functions of the
nature of external assistance.5
Most of the literature that focuses on Angola and Mozambique echoes the
more general arguments outlined above, including the neglect of the conflict sit-
uations.  Several scholars attribute the failed transition in Angola to the lack
of power-sharing agreements and the winner-takes-all elections.  J. Lewis
Rasmussen, for example, argues that the “lack of a powersharing option was a
major determinant in Jonas Savimbi’s decision . . . to breach the 1991 settlement
that temporarily ended Angola’s civil war . . ..”6 Norrie MacQueen and Fen
Osler Hampson make the same argument.7
Another typical way of viewing the failure in Angola and the success in
Mozambique is to point to differences in the nature of third-party intervention.
Hampson, explaining the failure in Angola, maintains that “the Achilles’ heel of
the agreement [Bicesse] was the lack of an adequate and effective third-party
presence and monitoring mechanism to supervise and assist with implementa-
tion.”8 The United Nations in particular is blamed for an ineffective intervention
in Angola.  It is argued that they committed too few resources to be able to facil-
itate the war to peace transition.  The success in Mozambique, by contrast, is
explained by the extent of resources and the comprehensiveness of the mandate
of the United Nations field mission.9 Some studies on Angola also deal with the
roles of the United States and the Soviet Union.  Victoria Brittain and Fernando
Gonvalces contend that insufficient superpower pressure was, in addition to the
insufficient role played by the United Nations, a primary cause for the collapse
of the Angolan peace process.10
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Conflict Situation
Compared to the impact of conflict resolution techniques on war to peace
transitions, there is surprisingly little written on the impact of conflict situations.
Three main arguments that focus – albeit not exclusively – on conflict situations
as explanations for success and failure of war to peace transitions can be identi-
fied:  ripe for resolution, external conflict dimensions, and economic dynamics.  
I.  William Zartman developed the concept of “ripe for resolution” in order
to identify the particular moment in time in which a conflict situation is config-
ured in a way that negotiation and mediation can succeed.  Negotiations and
mediation, according to Zartman, are likely to be successful if there is a hurting
stalemate.  Stalemate means that it is clear to all conflict parties that they cannot
unilaterally win the conflict.  Hurting means that the conflict parties “feel
uncomfortable in the costly dead end.”11 Although this concept is designed to
explain success and failure of negotiation and mediation (i.e. it was originally
designed to explain why a war to peace transition begins, not why its implemen-
tation succeeds or fails), it has become an important analytical tool for the study
of war to peace transitions.
Several scholars contend that the external dimension of internal wars
affects the outcome of war to peace transitions.  If the antagonism between exter-
nal conflict parties declines or even disappears, a settlement becomes more like-
ly.  If, by contrast, an external conflict in which an internal war is embedded is
exacerbated, a settlement becomes less likely.  This applies to global conflicts,
such as the Cold War, as well as to regional conflicts.12
Finally, Mats Berdal and David Keen focus on the economic aspect of
internal war.  They argue that the continuation of internal war is often a function
of the economic interest of one or more conflict parties.  According to the
authors, the current literature focuses too much on political violence and neglects
economic causes of war and continuation of war.  Analyzing economic origins of
violence helps us to understand internal wars that seem senseless when they are
understood as political conflicts only.13
Thus, with regard to the conflict situation, three causes for the outcome of
peace processes recur in the literature on war to peace transitions:  hurting stale-
mate, changes in the external dimension of internal war, and economic dynam-
ics.  The hurting stalemate, operationalized as a peculiar military situation, and
external conflict dynamics feature prominently in studies that aim to explain why
the peace agreements in Angola and Mozambique were concluded, but not why
their implementation failed or succeeded.14 The economic component of the
Angolan and Mozambican conflict situations, by contrast, has been addressed in
several studies.  The contention of these studies is that the termination of war was
an economic necessity in Mozambique, whereas the Angolan conflict parties had
the resources to continue the war.15
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Compatibility of Conflict Situation and Conflict Resolution Technique
The compatibility of conflict situation and conflict resolution technique is
an under-researched phenomenon.  This strand of the literature on war to peace
transitions is clearly the least developed.  Among the few scholars who address
the relationship between the two is Stephen John Stedman.16 Analyzing spoiler
problems in war to peace transitions, he develops a typology of spoilers that con-
sists of three types:  limited, greedy, and total.  A limited spoiler is a conflict party
that pursues limited goals during the peace process, such as the achievement of
a power-sharing solution, but does not oppose the overall peace process in prin-
ciple.  A greedy tries to profit from a peace process as much as possible, but is
also not principally opposed to peace.  A total spoiler, by contrast, is opposed to
the transition from war to peace, because it pursues the goal of attaining absolute
power.  
Stedman argues that the conflict resolution techniques have to be appro-
priate to the type of spoiler.  The strategy of inducement is apt to make a limited
spoiler stay in and conclude a war to peace transition.  Greedy spoilers need to
be socialized into a new set of norms that defines acceptable behavior.  In order
to make the spoiler abide by the norms, custodians regularly persuade the spoil-
er, and provide rewards and punishment.  Coercion, finally, is the strategy suit-
able to overcome the problems posed by a total spoiler.  In sum, Stedman con-
tends that conflict resolution techniques have to be employed according to the
demands of a certain conflict situation.  These demands are defined by the type
of spoiler, or types of spoilers, that a war to peace transition is troubled with.  
Very few studies on Angola and Mozambique deal with the fit or non-fit of
conflict resolution techniques and conflict situation.  Those that address this
issue tend to emphasize the interplay between the economic conflict situation
component and conflict resolution techniques.  According to this research,
Angola’s war could not be terminated because the techniques employed were not
apt to make UNITA give up its rich resource base.  Mozambique’s war ended
because the conflict resolution techniques used by the international community
were the conflict parties’ means to overcome economic exhaustion.17
RESEARCH DESIGN
For the purposes of this study, I define a war to peace transition as a
process that is aimed at transforming a violent mode of intra-state conflict
between two or more conflict parties, through the implementation of a negotiat-
ed peace agreement, into a non-violent mode that is carried out within the sys-
tems of conflict management of a newly created polity.  A war to peace transition
is concluded successfully if this transformation occurs, i.e. if the conflict
between the former war parties is carried out within the systems of conflict man-
agement, containment, and de-escalation of a new polity.  A war to peace transi-
tion fails if the conflict continues to be carried out in a violent mode.  I use the
terms peace process and war to peace transition interchangeably.
Fall 2002
62
Explaining the outcomes of the Angolan and Mozambican transitions
involves solving a three-fold puzzle: first, despite many similarities between the
Angolan and the Mozambican cases, the outcomes of the peace processes were
radically different.  Both countries had been ravaged by civil war for decades.  In
Angola, the MPLA government and the UNITA rebels had fought each other
since the early 1970s.  In Mozambique, the Frelimo government and the Renamo
insurgents had battled since the late 1970s.  Both countries embarked on a peace
process in the early 1990s.  MPLA and UNITA concluded the Bicesse Accord,
Frelimo and Renamo the Rome Agreement.  Both agreements sought to achieve
peace through democratization, most importantly through free and fair elections.
Both agreements were concluded in a changed international environment where
the Cold War had come to an end, and where South Africa was preparing its tran-
sition from an Apartheid state to a democracy.  Finally, the United Nations
deployed multifunctional peace missions in both Angola and Mozambique, in
order to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreements.  These field mis-
sions included military, civilian, and police functions, as opposed to the limita-
tion of traditional peacekeeping and observer missions to a military component.
In spite of all these similarities, the Angolan transition failed, whereas the Rome
Agreement was successfully implemented in Mozambique.  What explains these
different outcomes despite the similarities between the two cases?
Second, the Angolan transition consisted of two distinct phases, both of
which were unsuccessful.  The first phase involved the implementation of the
Bicesse Agreement.  After this process had failed, MPLA and UNITA signed a
new peace accord, the Lusaka Protocol.  There are significant differences
between these two accords.  The Lusaka Protocol, for example, contains a power-
sharing agreement between MPLA and UNITA, whereas the Bicesse Accord
does not.  Moreover, the United Nations considerably stepped up its presence:
the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II was replaced by
UNAVEM III.  Nevertheless, the outcome of the Bicesse and the Lusaka imple-
mentation process was the same:  return to war.  What explains this persistent
failure of the war to peace transition in Angola?
Third,  there were also two distinct phases in Mozambique, both overseen
by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ):  The first phase
lasted from the beginning of the implementation process in 1992 to mid-1993.
The entire implementation process of the Rome Agreement was behind schedule
from the very beginning, because Renamo obstructed the work in the political
commissions.  Initially, progress in Mozambique was even slower than in
Angola.  The second phase started in mid-1993 and lasted until the end of the
transition period.  In mid-1993, Frelimo and Renamo successfully resolved the
outstanding issues.  The political commissions became the motor of the war to
peace transition, as envisaged in the Rome Agreement.  Why were these two
phases so different? What happened in mid-1993 in Mozambique?
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Hence, in attempting to explain the outcomes of the Angolan and
Mozambican peace processes, this study asks three questions: first, what
explains the variance of the war to peace transitions across the two cases, i.e.
Angola and Mozambique?; second, what accounts for the lack of variance with-
in the Angolan case?; and third, why was there a significant variance within the
Mozambican case?
Each of the hypotheses outlined in the literature review are tested accord-
ing to these three questions.  Which of those contentions can give an answer to
all three questions? The hypotheses are clearly specified and do not pose any dif-
ficulties for testing.  There is one exception:  Stedman’s argument on the com-
patibility of conflict situation and conflict resolution techniques does not speci-
fy why a party is an absolute or a limited spoiler.  This study uses the three com-
ponents of the conflict situation as outlined in the literature to determine what
kind of spoiler a party is:  external conflict dimension, military stalemate, and
economic situation.
COMPARING CONFLICT RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES
IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE
Are the outcomes in Angola and Mozambique due to conflict resolution
techniques,  irrespective of the conflict situation? This section tests the two main
arguments that the literature on conflict resolution techniques has generated:
power-sharing agreement and large-scale external intervention.
Power-sharing Agreements Versus Winner-takes-it-all Elections
Is a war to peace transition, independent of the conflict situation, more
likely to be successful if power-sharing agreements between the rival parties are
included? The Angolan and the Mozambican cases suggest that the answer is no.
It fails all three tests.  First, it cannot explain the lack of variance during the
Angolan war to peace transition.  Angola’s UNITA rejected the electoral results,
independent of whether the elections were winner-takes-all elections or whether
there was a power-sharing agreement.  The Bicesse Agreement of 1991 formu-
lated the principles for a winner-takes-all election.18 After UNITA went back to
war, a second agreement was concluded, the Lusaka Protocol, that stipulated the
rules for a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), and
provincial and local responsibilities for UNITA officials.19 Yet, again UNITA
returned to war.20 The presence or absence of power-sharing agreements, there-
fore, fails to explain the persistent failure to bring the Angolan war to an end.  
Second, the power-sharing argument cannot explain why the Mozambican
peace process consisted of two distinct phases:  failure before June 1993, and
success thereafter.  Power-sharing agreements were never agreed upon in the
Mozambican peace process.  The elections were winner-takes-all elections – an
arrangement that causes the failure of war to peace transitions according to the
power-sharing argument.  
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Third, the power-sharing hypothesis cannot explain the difference between
the Angolan and the Mozambican experiences.  Nowhere in the Rome
Agreement, concluded between Frelimo and Renamo, are power-sharing agree-
ments mentioned for the time after the elections.  Indeed, when Frelimo won the
elections, it was not even prepared to appoint Renamo governors for the
provinces in which Renamo had won the elections.  In contrast to Angola’s
power-sharing provisions in the Lusaka Protocol, the elections in Mozambique
were winner-takes-all elections.  Nevertheless, Mozambique’s war to peace tran-
sition was successful, whereas Angola’s was not.  
Nature of Third-Party Intervention I:  External Pressure
Does “extensive third-party involvement,”21 independent from the conflict
situation, cause successful war to peace transitions? This section on third-party
involvement focuses on external pressure by state and non-state actors.  The next
section deals specifically with United Nations peace missions.  
For the first time in its history, the United Nations Security Council, acting
explicitly under Chapter VII of the Charter, imposed an arms embargo against a
party to an internal war as a reaction to UNITA’s breaches of the Bicesse
Agreement.22 Yet this pressure had no effect.  The Lusaka Protocol could not be
implemented despite this pressure.  No such pressure occurred against any of the
Mozambican parties.  The arms embargo, a highly significant type of third-party
pressure, therefore, cannot explain the lack of variance during the Angolan peace
process and the different outcomes of the Angolan and Mozambican transitions.
On the contrary:  it makes them even more puzzling.
It has been correctly emphasized in the literature that superpower pressure
on the Angolan parties declined significantly after the Bicesse Agreement was
concluded.23 Pressure by the Soviet Union and the United States to end the war
was crucial for the successful negotiations that led to the agreement.  Yet, after
the agreement was signed, pressure declined.  The Soviet Union collapsed in
December 1991, and Moscow was compelled to concentrate on its domestic sit-
uation rather than to continue its superpower role in world politics.  United States
involvement was ideologically motivated to such a degree that Washington ini-
tially continued to assist UNITA, even after it had begun to wage a new war.  It
was only eight months after Angola’s elections that the United States recognized
the MPLA government.
Again, however, it is problematic to conclude from this that the lack of
external pressure, in this case superpower pressure, caused the failure of conflict
resolution in Angola.  The United Nations sanctions have been mentioned
already.  In addition to this, the United States and Russia resumed their strong
pressure shortly after the failure of the implementation of Bicesse.  At the begin-
ning of 1998, this led analysts such as Norrie MacQueen to conclude that the
“qualified success,”24 as the author put it, of UNAVEM III and MONUA was
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caused by strong pressure from the United States and Russia.  History proved this
statement wrong.  The latter half of 1998 saw Angola relapse into full-scale war
– despite strong pressure from the United States and Russia to settle the conflict.
Hence, regardless of the extent of superpower pressure, the Angolan peace
process failed.  
The Mozambican conflict was less “nurtured” through external pressure
than the Angolan one.  This had already begun with the peace negotiations in
which the Roman Catholic Church and Zimbabwe featured as the most impor-
tant mediators.  The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union, and
later Russia, was confined to a non-formal role.  Zimbabwe’s mediation efforts
proved important during the peace process, as did the efforts of South Africa,
Malawi, Portugal, and the United States.  These efforts, however, are by no
means comparable to the pressure exerted by the United States and the Soviet
Union/Russia in Angola that culminated in the first-ever imposition of sanctions
against an insurgency movement by the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter.  Diplomatic pressure, therefore, cannot explain the different
outcomes in Angola and Mozambique.  Contrary to what the hypothesis on third-
party intervention predicts, the transition with more diplomatic pressure was
unsuccessful.  It also cannot explain the two different phases of the Mozambican
transition.  Diplomatic pressure in the unsuccessful first phase was not signifi-
cantly different from the successful second phase.
Nature of Third-Party Intervention II:  United Nations Peace Missions
Much of the literature on war to peace transitions in general and on the
Angolan and Mozambican cases in particular focuses on the United Nations field
missions.  It is proposed that the more resources a field mission has, the more
likely it is to be successful.  Here, the three tests yield mixed results.  While the
hypothesis gives a plausible explanation for the two different phases of the
Mozambican transition, it cannot explain the lack of variance in Angola and the
differences across the Angolan and the Mozambican cases.
The hypothesis cannot explain the Angolan case.  The Angolan war to
peace transition failed independently of the extent of third-party intervention.
The United Nations have successively deployed four peace-support operations in
Angola.  UNAVEM I was a small observer mission designed to monitor and ver-
ify the withdrawal of Cuban troops.  After this mission had been completed suc-
cessfully, UNAVEM II was deployed in order to oversee the implementation of
the Bicesse Agreement.  UNAVEM II was again only a small observer mission.
Its maximum strength consisted of slightly more than 1,000 personnel:  350 mil-
itary observers, 126 United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), and the rest
civilian personnel, most of whom were electoral observers.  Not only the human
resources were very limited, but also the monetary resources.  Less than US$200
million is indeed a very small amount of money for a peace-support operation
Fall 2002
66
that is designed to oversee a war to peace transition.  The United Nations spent
double the amount for the war to peace transition in Namibia, three times the
amount in Mozambique, and ten times in Cambodia.25
The limited mandate of UNAVEM II corresponded to its scarce resources.
According to the Bicesse Agreement, the United Nations had the mandate to
monitor and verify the ceasefire, the performance of the government’s and
UNITA’s police, as well as the cantonment and demobilization process.26 This
monitoring function, however, was confined to monitoring the joint government-
UNITA monitoring teams.  The United Nations did not have a mandate for direct
monitoring and verification.  Only with regard to the elections did the United
Nations have the mandate for direct monitoring.27 The mandate of the United
Nations was limited in two further aspects.  First, its role in the political com-
missions was tenuous because the United Nations representative was only an
“invited guest.”28 Moreover, the United Nations did not have a mandate with
regard to the creation of a new defense force.  Given the scarce resources and its
limited mandate, it seems logically sound to conclude that the failed implemen-
tation of the Bicesse Agreement was due to the insufficient third-party interven-
tion by the United Nations as so often stated in the literature.  
The failed implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, however, contradicts
this conclusion.  A new peace mission was deployed:  UNAVEM III.  The man-
date of UNAVEM III was much more comprehensive than the mandate of
UNAVEM II.  Only the electoral mandate remained the same:  monitor and ver-
ify.  All other functions went well beyond those stipulated in the Bicesse
Agreement.  According to the Lusaka Protocol, the United Nations mandate with
regard to the ceasefire implementation surpassed mere monitoring and verifica-
tion, in particular beyond the indirect monitoring mandate for UNAVEM II.  The
Protocol states that the “overall supervision, control and verification of the re-
established cease-fire will be the responsibility of the United Nations . . .  with
the participation of the Government and UNITA.”  The United Nations, there-
fore, assumed primary responsibility for overseeing the ceasefire.  Cantonment
and demobilization were to be monitored directly as was the performance of the
local police, both in contrast to the indirect mandate for UNAVEM II.  UNAVEM
III had the mandate to monitor and verify the integration of government and
UNITA forces into one new national defense force.  UNAVEM II did not have a
mandate in this subject area at all with the exception of participation in the work
of political commissions as “invited guest.”  UNAVEM III also had a much
broader mandate with regard to these commissions.  The United Nations
assumed chairpersonship in the only commission provided for by the Lusaka
Protocol, the Joint Commission, and even had a mandate for good offices and
mediation.29
Corresponding to the enlarged mandate were the resources allocated to
UNAVEM III.  The overall expenses of the peace-support operation amounted to
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almost US$900 million, more than four times the expenses of UNAVEM II.  The
maximum strength of UNAVEM III was more than 7,000 persons, which is seven
times the number of UNAVEM II’s personnel.  Perhaps most significantly,
UNAVEM III was a peacekeeping operation including more than 6,000 armed
troops.  UNAVEM II, by contrast, was an observer mission without blue hel-
mets.30
Thus, the hypothesis of third-party intervention fails to explain the dynam-
ics of the Angolan peace process.  UNAVEM III had a much more comprehen-
sive mandate and much more human and monetary resources than UNAVEM II.
Nevertheless, and in contradiction to the hypothesis of third-party intervention,
the result was the same:  neither UNAVEM II, nor UNAVEM III were able to ful-
fil their objectives.  
The argument of the significance of external intervention, irrespective of
the conflict situation, becomes even more problematic when UNAVEM III and
ONUMOZ are compared.  The two missions had the same mandate as far as the
work in political commissions, cantonment and demobilization, elections, and
the performance of the local police are concerned.31 Yet the mandate of
UNAVEM III went beyond ONUMOZ’s mandate in the subject areas of the per-
formance of local police, the creation of the new armed forces and, in particular,
the ceasefire.  The Rome Agreement did not provide for the monitoring of the
local police.  Only one year after the peace agreement was concluded, the con-
flict parties requested the United Nations to directly monitor and verify the per-
formance of the local police.  One month later, in November 1993, the
UNCIVPOL component of ONUMOZ arrived in Mozambique.  The monitoring
mandate of UNAVEM III, by contrast, was included in the Lusaka Protocol.  As
a consequence, police observers were deployed more promptly than in
Mozambique.32 Moreover, the Rome Agreement did not provide for a United
Nations mandate for the creation of a new defense force, except for the political
work in the commissions.  The Lusaka Protocol, by contrast, gave the United
Nations the mandate to monitor and verify the integration process of the former
rival military organizations of MPLA and UNITA.  Finally, the function of ONU-
MOZ was confined to monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, whereas the man-
date of UNAVEM III included the supervision and control of the ceasefire with
the participation of the conflict parties; that is it included the legal grounds to
request changes of the parties’ behavior.33 In short, the mandates of UNAVEM
III and ONUMOZ were similar with the former’s being slightly more compre-
hensive than the latter’s.  
As far as resources are concerned, UNAVEM III and ONUMOZ are again
similar, but again slightly more resources were allocated to UNAVEM III.  The
human resources were alike.  The maximum strength of UNAVEM III was well
over 7,000, more than 6,500 of which were troops.  The maximum strength of
ONUMOZ was more than 9,000, of which more than 6,000 were peacekeepers.34
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The slight difference in personnel was due to the fact that ONUMOZ oversaw an
electoral process, something that was envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol, but no
elections were held.  The monetary resources allocated amounted to almost
US$900 million in the case of UNAVEM III, but only to slightly more than
US$500 million in the case of ONUMOZ.  
Thus, UNAVEM III had a more comprehensive mandate and allocated
more resources to the peace process than ONUMOZ.  In Mozambique, there was
only one peace mission, the costs of which amounted to slightly more than
US$500 million.  In Angola, four peace missions, UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II,
UNAVEM III, and MONUA cost US$1.3 billion.35 Nevertheless, and contrary
to what much of the literature on conflict resolution techniques would predict,
UNAVEM III failed to facilitate Angola’s war to peace transition, whereas ONU-
MOZ succeeded.  
Yet the hypothesis of third-party intervention sheds light on the difference
between the two Mozambican phases.  When Renamo obstructed the political
commissions in mid-1993, the United Nations established a Trust Fund that was
designed, inter alia, to provide the necessary resources for Renamo’s transfor-
mation into a political party.  Renamo resumed its work in the political commis-
sions.  After the United Nations had begun to pay Renamo’s leader, Alfonso
Dhlakama, US$300,000 in order to overcome Renamo’s logistical difficulties,
the work in the political commissions speeded up, and the successful phase of the
Mozambican transition began.  
In sum, we are left with a new puzzle: comparing the Angolan and the
Mozambican cases, hypotheses on conflict resolution techniques predict that
failure in Mozambique is more likely than in Angola.  Comparing the two phas-
es of the Angolan peace process, they predict that the implementation of the
Lusaka Agreement is more likely to succeed than the implementation of the
Bicesse Agreement.  Both predictions are clearly wrong.  Yet conflict techniques
can explain the difference between the two distinct phases of the Mozambican
transition.  This finding points to the need for a more refined analysis that is able
to explain when a certain conflict resolution technique is likely to be successful
and when not.36
COMPARING THE ANGOLAN AND MOZAMBICAN
CONFLICT SITUATIONS
Do different conflict situations explain the difference between the Angolan
and the Mozambican outcomes? Does a change of the Mozambican conflict sit-
uation help us to understand why a phase of success followed a phase of failure?
Does an unchanging, intractable conflict situation explain the failure in Angola?
This section tests the three key variables found in the conflict situation literature:
external conflict dimension, hurting military stalemate, and economic dynamics.  
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External Conflict Dimension
Until the 1990s, the Angolan and the Mozambican wars were embedded in
the regional conflict between Apartheid-South Africa and the Front Line States
north of South Africa who fought Apartheid and Pretoria’s occupation of South-
West Africa (now Namibia).  In addition to this, the Angolan war was intertwined
with the superpower antagonism of the Cold War.  Both aspects of the external
conflict situation were resolved by the time the peace processes in Angola and
Mozambique began.  
The Angolan war was highly internationalized from the very beginning.
Foreign aid was the principal tool through which MPLA and UNITA sought to
increase their capabilities to fight each other, and, before the Portuguese with-
drawal, also to fight the colonial power.  Foreign aid was forthcoming and the
Angolan war became firmly embedded in the Cold War and in the regional con-
flict between South Africa and the Front Line States.  The Soviet Union, trying
to expand its sphere of influence into the Third World, supported the MPLA.
Cuba, in accordance with its interventionist communist ideology, provided com-
bat troops.  The United States, following the Cold War logic of countering the
Soviet threat everywhere in the world, extended its support to UNITA.37 South
Africa assisted UNITA with material and human resources as soon as Portugal
began to withdraw from Angola in 1974.  Pretoria’s original objective was to pre-
vent the coming to power of the MPLA, a party that was allied to the South West
African People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress
(ANC).  When this objective failed, Pretoria used UNITA as a tool to weaken the
antagonistic government in Luanda, and to prevent the infiltration of SWAPO
and ANC guerrillas into South Africa’s de facto province of South West Africa.
UNITA established its provisional capital, Jamba, in south-east Angola, and pre-
vented the infiltration of SWAPO and ANC guerrillas into the north-east of South
West Africa.  South African cross-border raids prevented an infiltration in the
west.
The Cold War dimension of Angola’s war was the first external dimension
to be resolved.  With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, a dètente
between the superpowers began that ultimately culminated in the end of the Cold
War.  In 1986, spokesmen reported from the Twenty-seventh Party Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that Moscow favored the political set-
tlement of regional conflicts.  Cuba’s withdrawal was due to Soviet pressure and
the resolution of the regional conflict dimension.  In 1988, South Africa signed
the Brazzaville Protocol according to which it would withdraw from Namibia
within one year.  The Namibian-Angola border, therefore, lost its strategic sig-
nificance for Pretoria in the late 1980s.  More importantly, of course, Nelson
Mandela’s release from prison in 1990 was a strong indication that Apartheid,
along with foreign policies aimed at protecting it, was about to come to an end.  
In contrast to the Angolan war, the Mozambican war was not part of the
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Cold War, but was caught up in the regional conflict between Apartheid-South
Africa and the Front Line States.38 In 1977, Rhodesian intelligence formed, out
of a nucleus of exiled Frelimo opponents, a terror movement soon to be named
Renamo.39 When the Lancaster House Agreement put an end to white minority
rule in what was soon renamed Zimbabwe in 1979, South Africa took over as
Renamo’s principal patron.  In 1978, P.W.  Botha had come to power and from
then on his notion of a “Total Onslaught” of communism against South Africa
shaped Pretoria’s foreign policies.40 South Africa began to destabilize
Mozambique by supplying Renamo with arms and other equipment from mid-
1979 onward.  
In 1984, Mozambique, as a last resort after almost a decade of devastating
war, concluded the Nkomati Accord with South Africa.  In Maputo’s perception,
the war was caused by a foreign power and the same foreign power had the key
to its resolution.  South Africa and Mozambique agreed to cut off any assistance
for Renamo and the ANC, respectively.  Initially, South Africa did not abide by
the agreement.  In 1988, however, Mozambique and South Africa decided to
revive Nkomati.  From then on, Pretoria abided by the agreement.  Two years
later, as outlined above, South Africa had finally taken the road to freedom for
all its people, and Pretoria was about to change fundamentally not only its
domestic but also its foreign policies.  
Hence, the resolution of the external conflict dimension seems to having
been a necessary condition for the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique
to be initiated.  Yet it cannot account for their different outcomes.  Although the
overarching external conflicts were resolved in both cases, the outcomes of the
peace processes were radically different.  Additionally, the first phase of the
Mozambican transition was a failure although the external conflict dimension
was resolved.  
Hurting Military Stalemate
Hurting military stalemates facilitated the conclusion of the Bicesse
Agreement and the Lusaka Protocol for Angola, and the Rome Agreement for
Mozambique.41 During the Lusaka implementation, the hurting stalemate con-
tinued.  During the Bicesse and Rome implementations, by contrast, the military
situation changed in favor of the insurgents.  
Before the Bicesse implementation started, there was a hurting military
stalemate between the Angolan conflict parties.  MPLA and UNITA had fought
each other for over 25 years, first as rival insurgencies and then as government
and insurgents, but had been unable to defeat each other.  From 1985 onward, the
military situation changed critically in favor of the MPLA.  By July 1985, gov-
ernment forces had encircled the region around Jamba, UNITA’s provisional cap-
ital in south-eastern Angola, and threatened UNITA’s main logistic base at
Mavinga from nearby Cuito Cuanavale.  Yet all the government’s attempts to
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take the base failed, although UNITA remained under siege in 1986 and 1987.  At
the end of 1989, the MPLA attacked Mavinga again.  UNITA, however, suc-
cessfully reverted to guerrilla tactics and defended this critical base.  Mavinga
showed a military stalemate at a particular moment of time.  The MPLA was
clearly stronger than UNITA in military terms – in the very contrast to UNITA it
could even threaten UNITA’s stronghold in the south-east – but the government
could not eliminate the insurgency movement on the battlefield.  
This military situation was not only a military stalemate, but also a hurting
military stalemate.  UNITA’s very existence had been threatened by the govern-
ment offensives.  The insurgents could only narrowly escape military defeat.
Moreover, they had lost much of their territory.  In order to remove the strong
military pressure, UNITA had to fundamentally change its interaction with the
MPLA.42 The MPLA, for its part, was not in a winning situation either.  The
momentary military situation favored the government, but the future looked
bleak.  The MPLA faced dramatically dwindling Soviet support.  In addition to
this, Cuban troops, much more crucial for the MPLA than South African troops
for UNITA, had stopped fighting on the side of the government.  United States
support for UNITA, on the contrary, was increasing.  The longer the war lasted,
the weaker the MPLA and the stronger UNITA would become.43 This hurting
military stalemate was one of the main reasons the two rivals began negotiations
and concluded the Bicesse Agreement.
The implementation of the peace treaty, however, critically changed the
military situation in favor of UNITA.  The ceasefire as well as the cantonment
and demobilization process took away the military pressure from UNITA.  The
government troops had to give up strategically important positions and withdraw
to cantonment areas.  UNITA, therefore, ceased to be the beleaguered insurgency
movement on the brink of military defeat.  After UNITA lost the elections, it took
advantage of the new favorable military situation.  The insurgents went back to
war and made rapid gains throughout the country.  It took almost two years
before the government could stop UNITA’s advance on all fronts.  
Eventually, another stalemate brought the MPLA and in particular UNITA
back to the negotiating table.  UNITA had made enormous gains throughout the
country in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bicesse implementation process.
The rebels, however, were far from militarily defeating the government.
UNITA’s control had been extended to new areas in the countryside, in particu-
lar to eastern Angola.  Yet the urban centers, with very few exceptions, remained
under government control.  Moreover, there were indications that UNITA’s mil-
itary success was about to be reversed.  First, UNITA was territorially over-
stretched and was not able to meet the logistical demands of defending its newly
occupied territories.  Second, the government was about to launch a powerful
counteroffensive that had been prepared through the massive purchase of arms
and the hiring of mercenaries.  Third, international pressure on UNITA peaked.
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UNITA had isolated itself internationally by breaking the Bicesse Agreement.44
This had, as mentioned above, even led to the first-ever Chapter VII measure
against an insurgency movement by the United Nations.  The MPLA, on its part,
was further away from military victory against UNITA than ever before.  And
more importantly, in contrast to the costs of continued military confrontation, the
costs for a settlement for the MPLA were low.  The main objective of the Lusaka
Protocol was to implement the electoral result of Angola’s first free and fair elec-
tions that had been won by the MPLA.  
In contrast to the Bicesse implementation, the Lusaka implementation did
not fundamentally change the military situation, at least not in favor of the insur-
gents.  This time it was not the government, but UNITA that had to withdraw its
troops from positions they had just gained.  In addition to this, UNITA lost its
most important regional ally during the Lusaka implementation.  In what was
soon to be renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNITA’s ally,
Mobutu Sese Seko was ousted, and replaced by the MPLA’s ally, Laurent Kabila.
This threatened UNITA’s supply routes through the Congo that had become even
more important since Namibia had gained its independence from South Africa.
Despite this unfavorable military situation, however, UNITA obstructed the
peace process and, finally, resumed the war as it had done at the end of the
Bicesse implementation process.  UNITA, therefore, returned to war, whether the
military situation was favourable or not.
In Mozambique, Frelimo and Renamo fought each other for 15 years.
From 1979 to 1980, the Frelimo government seemed capable of militarily elim-
inating the insurgency group.  From 1981 to 1985, however, Renamo expanded
from its strongholds in Zambézia, Manica, and Sofala provinces in central
Mozambique, and extended its military operations into every province except
Cabo Delgado in the north.  Attempts by Frelimo – from 1982 onward also by
Zimbabwe – to effectively counter Renamo, failed.  Due to Zimbabwean support,
the military balance shifted again in favor of the government in 1985.  By July,
Zimbabwean troops had started their military campaign in Renamo’s strongholds
in the Manica and Sofala provinces.  In August 1985, Zimbabwean troops over-
ran casa banana, Renamo’s headquarters in the Gorongosa mountains.45 In
1986, a highly successful offensive against Renamo in Zambézia began.  By the
end of 1987, Renamo had managed to maintain a strong presence in the province
only in the areas of Upper Zambézia which were difficult to access.  A similarly
effective offensive was carried out in Manica and Sofala provinces in 1989.  A
year later, Renamo no longer held a single town and its control of “Free
Mozambique” was confined to a few small and isolated difficult access areas in
central Mozambique.
At the end of the 1980s, a hurting military stalemate developed.  Not only
was Renamo incapable of defeating the government, but the rebels had also lost
most of their territories, and even their headquarters.  Even worse, Renamo had
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lost its only patron, South Africa.  The government’s advance against Renamo-
controlled areas, however, did not defeat Renamo.  The insurgents increased their
acts of large-scale terror and sabotage, targeting the agricultural and industrial
centers in central and southern Mozambique.  Neither was the Mozambican gov-
ernment capable of military victory, nor was it able to remove Renamo’s pressure
on its rule, caused by acts of sabotage and large-scale terror.  In addition to this,
the international community pressed for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.  
The military situation in Mozambique changed in much the same way as the
Angolan one during the Bicesse implementation.  Renamo’s military situation
improved during the peace process.  Most importantly, it was better at the begin-
ning of the successful second than at the beginning of the failed first phase of the
implementation process.  The ceasefire as well as cantonment and demobilization
not only put an end to a highly threatening military situation, but also enabled
Renamo to return to its strongholds in central Mozambique.  Nevertheless,
Renamo did not resume the war.  Nevertheless, the second phase of the
Mozambican peace process was successful, whereas the first phase was not.
Hence, the research puzzle has again become more puzzling.  The presence
or absence of a hurting stalemate helps to explain why peace agreements were
concluded in Angola and Mozambique, but not why the two processes collapsed
in Angola, and why the Mozambican transition was successful.  In Mozambique,
the implementation process of the Rome Agreement changed from failure to suc-
cess, although the military situation changed in favor of Renamo during the
implementation of the peace agreement.  In Angola, UNITA went back to fight-
ing whether or not the military situation improved during the peace process.  
Economic Situation
There is a significant difference between the Angolan and the Mozambican
conflict situation as far as the economic dynamics of the conflict are concerned.
Complete economic exhaustion was a major cause for peace negotiations and
conflict resolution in Mozambique.  The Angolan parties, by contrast, not only
had plentiful resources to continue the war, but also much to lose in case of an
electoral defeat.  
Angola, as often emphasized in the literature, is potentially one of the rich-
est countries in Africa due to its abundant natural resources, in particular oil and
diamonds.  From the late 1970s onward, the oil revenues for the government
grew enormously.  Between 1979 and 1983, for example, annual revenues of
crude oil export increased from US$1 billion to US $1.5 billion.46 This trend
continued.  At the time of the peace process, Angola’s oil fields in the north-west
of the country and in the Cabinda enclave pumped 500,000 barrels annually.
UNITA financed its war with the diamonds in Angola’s east.  Immediately after
the Bicesse implementation collapsed, for instance, UNITA shipped diamonds
worth more than US$100 million to Europe and Israel within only two months.47  
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Throughout the war, neither the MPLA nor UNITA had been able to threat-
en the resources of the other.  Roughly speaking, Angola was divided into two
parts:  west and east.  UNITA dominated the east, the government the west.  The
insurgents, although determined to put pressure on the government through ter-
ror and sabotage, never succeeded in threatening the government’s industrial
assets in western Angola.  The MPLA failed to rid UNITA of its resource base in
the east, in particular the central-east and south-east.  
Angola’s mineral riches were a twofold problem for the peace process:
first, the conflict parties had the resources to fight a war, even without or with
less external aid than during the Cold War; and second, both parties had much to
lose in case the other won the elections.  The extension of state administration,
laid down in the Bicesse Agreement and the Lusaka Protocol, would encompass
the turn over of economically extremely profitable territories to the rival.  It
would mean losing plentiful resources, and making the rival stronger.  
The economic situation in Mozambique was very different.  Beginning in
the mid-1980s, Frelimo and Renamo were running out of resources needed to
wage war for two reasons.  First, Mozambique is poorly endowed with natural
resources and is one of the least industrially developed countries in the world.
Second, Frelimo and Renamo, in contrast to MPLA and UNITA, successfully tar-
geted each other’s already scarce resource bases.  Renamo succeeded in estab-
lishing itself in a strategically important location, the Gorongosa mountains,
close to the Beira corridor in central Mozambique, from where it could put enor-
mous pressure on the economy.  The insurgents systematically targeted the cor-
ridor’s agricultural and industrial centers as well as the road and railway traffic
to and from the port of Beira.  Moreover, the insurgency movement was also very
effective in disrupting the economy in the south.  Even industrial production on
the outskirts of Maputo was hit by Renamo.  The insurgents, however, were
under enormous economic pressure as well.  The joint Zimbabwean-Frelimo
offensives were successful in retaking Renamo-controlled areas in central
Mozambique, including the rebel’s headquarters, thereby further limiting
Renamo’s resource base.  
While the economic situation had been precarious since the outbreak of
war, Mozambique’s economic situation grew desperate at the beginning of the
1990s.  During a severe drought from 1990 to 1992, mass starvation could no
longer be averted.  The provinces particularly affected were Nampula, Zambèzia,
Manica, Sofala, Gaza, and Inhambane.  Thus, both government and Renamo-
held areas were affected.  The Gross National Product (GNP) per capita helps to
illustrate the desperate situation.  The GNP per capita had dropped dramatically
from US $270 in 1985 to US $170 in 1986.  Another landslide drop occurred
between 1986 and 1987, when it further decreased to US $80.  After it had
remained at approximately the same level from 1987 to 1991, it fell to a dramat-
ic low of US $65 in 1992.48 Since the country was in a state of complete exhaus-
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tion the fighting between the two parties became a low-intensity affair at the
beginning of the 1990s.  The foes even reached agreement about food supplies to
Renamo areas.  A fundamental change of interaction between Frelimo and
Renamo was an economic necessity.  
The economic dynamics offer a plausible explanation why the Angolan
transition was a failure.  The resource endowment of Angola is a structural fac-
tor that did not change during the transition period.  UNITA, the loser of the elec-
tions, would have lost at least a considerable part of its access to resources, had
it accepted the conclusion of the peace process.  The economic argument also
offers a plausible explanation as to why the outcome of the peace process in
Angola was so different from Mozambique.  In the latter, peace was an econom-
ic imperative, whereas in the former peace was an economic disadvantage for
one party.  Yet the hypothesis on economic dynamics does not explain why there
was a phase of failure and a phase of success in Mozambique.  There was eco-
nomic exhaustion in both phases.  
COMPATIBILITY OF CONFLICT SITUATION AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION TECHNIQUE
The compatibility of the conflict situation and the conflict resolution tech-
niques explains the research puzzle of this study.  Due to a lack of compatibility,
Angola’s Bicesse and Lusaka implementation were unsuccessful.
Mozambique’s transition, by contrast, succeeded, because the conflict resolution
techniques used in Mozambique’s second implementation phase matched the
needs of the conflict situation.  
During and immediately after the Bicesse implementation, the custodians
of the peace process, in particular the United Nations and the United States, tried
to use a strategy of inducement to make UNITA abide by the peace agreement.
Even after UNITA had returned to war, the United States interpreted its actions
as understandable.  The result of the failure of these inducements was the most
destructive phase of the Angolan war that ended only with the conclusion of the
Lusaka Protocol.  
UNITA was a total spoiler for whom strategies of inducement were inade-
quate.  UNITA had its own state-within-a-state and abundant resources.  To give
up the occupation of its territories and to transform into a political party would
have meant surrendering political and enormous economic power to the arch-
enemy.  To be sure, some mistakes made during the Bicesse implementation were
not made during the Lusaka implementation.  Most notably, the United Nations
tried to use a strategy of coercion in a number of instances.  The arms embargo
by the Security Council is the best example for this.  However, coercion was lim-
ited to a few actions by the United Nations, and even these actions were incom-
plete.  Again, the arms embargo, which was largely ineffective, is the best exam-
ple for this.
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Renamo, by contrast, was not a total, but a limited spoiler.  Given the
enormously precarious economic situation that the Mozambican rebels faced,
there was hardly an alternative to peace, but this peace had to pay off.  Renamo
did not obstruct the peace as such, but tried to profit from it as much as possible.
The inducements by the United Nations were apt to make Renamo abide by the
Rome Agreement.  Most of these inducements started only in mid-1993, the
beginning of the successful phase of the peace process.  In mid-May, a Trust
Fund for the implementation of the Rome Agreement was created that was
designed, inter alia, to provide resources for Renamo’s transition into a political
party.  Italy alone contributed nearly US$6 million to this fund.  From September
onward, Renamo received payments of US$300,000 a month, finally growing to
US$3.9 million by October 1994, when the war to peace transition was success-
fully concluded.  Finally, during his visit to Mozambique, the United Nations
Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, used US$1.2 billion in promised
grants and loans as inducement for Renamo.  He announced that these funds
would be held until Renamo and the government had achieved substantial
progress in the peace process.  With the beginning of these inducements, the
peace process was put back on track.  By November 1993, the political commis-
sions, previously obstructed by Renamo, had become, as Richard Snyge put it,
“the cockpit of the peace process.”49
CONCLUSION
The dominant strand of literature on war to peace transitions and most
studies on the Angolan and Mozambican peace processes argue that the outcome
of war to peace transitions is a function of the conflict resolution techniques
employed.  By comparing across and within the Angolan and the Mozambican
peace processes, this study develops the argument that not only do conflict reso-
lution techniques alone fail to explain the different outcomes in Angola and
Mozambique, but they even predict the opposite of what actually happened.
According to hypotheses on conflict resolution techniques, the Mozambican
transition was more likely to fail than the Angolan peace process.  Likewise, the
two cases cannot be explained by focussing on the conflict situations only.
Instead, the outcomes in Angola and Mozambique are best explained by a non-
fit and fit between conflict resolution techniques and conflict situation, respec-
tively.  In other words, evidence from the Angolan and the Mozambican experi-
ences strongly suggests that conflict resolution techniques have to match a given
conflict situation in order to be successful.  
Yet this issue of compatibility has been neglected in the literature.  Three
points are essential to enhance our understanding of the relationship between
conflict resolution techniques and conflict situations.  First, studies of war to
peace transitions require an in-depth analysis of the case or the cases under
scrutiny.  It is only through detailed analysis that the peculiar configuration of a
certain conflict situation can be identified, and repercussions of conflict resolu-
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tion techniques can be meaningfully assessed.  Second, research on war to peace
transitions should draw pragmatically from existing theoretical perspectives to
understand the interplay of conflict situation and conflict resolution techniques.
Rationalist theories, for example, study the logic of choice under the constraints
of a given situation without inquiring into issues of identity and interest forma-
tion.  This perspective may be useful for gaining insights into conflicts that are
predominantly about resources.  Yet it may be too limited for the study of ethnic
conflicts in which the actors’ identities play an important role.  Constructivist
approaches, inquiring into actors’ attachment of meaning to a material world,
may be more apt to help explain the dynamics of such conflicts.  Third, more
research is needed about what conflict resolution techniques, whether successful
or not, actually do.  This requires researchers to go beyond plausible correlations
and inquire into generative mechanisms:  how do conflict resolution techniques
influence the actors during a peace process? What techniques persuade them and
how? What conflict resolution norms are internalized, under what conditions, by
what actors? Is mere coercion sufficient to make a party abide by an agreement?
If so, under what conditions?
To be sure, these three suggestions do not make the task of the researcher
easier.  On the contrary, they  point to a more complex research agenda.  Yet it
may be an agenda that helps us to considerably improve our understanding of the
dynamics of peaceful conflict resolution – an understanding that is so highly
important in today’s world.
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